This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for two-network zero-sum games with set constraints, where the two networks have the opposite nonsmooth cost functions. The interaction of the agents in each network is characterized by an unbalanced directed graph. We are particularly interested in the case that the local cost function of each agent in the two networks is unknown in this paper. We first construct the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles based on the measurements of the local cost functions. Instead of using subgradients of the local cost functions, the subgradientfree two-variable oracles are employed to design the distributed algorithm for the agents to search the Nash equilibrium. Under the strong connectivity assumption, it is shown that the proposed algorithm guarantees that the states of all the agents converge almost surely to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, where the scale of the neighborhood can be arbitrarily small by selecting suitable smooth parameter in the oracles. Numerical simulations are finally given to validate the theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Zero-sum game problem has arisen in engineering application domains such as adversarial estimation of sensor networks and power allocation of channels in presence of jammers [1] , [2] . Due to the theoretical significances and broad applications, the study on how to search the Nash equilibrim has been one of the main focuses of the works on zero-sum games [3] . Various approaches have been developed to find the Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games, including fictitious play [4] , best response approach [5] , and subgradient-based approach [6] . The above works [4] - [6] solve the problems in the centralized settings and consider that all the strategic agents are adversarial. Recently, the study on zero-sum games in the networked settings has received much attention. In particular, Gharesifard and Cortes [7] focused on the two-network zerosum games, where the two networks, viewed as two players, were adversarial while the strategic agents in the same network were collaborative. Based on the local information exchange, a distributed method that synthesizes the consensus dynamics and the saddle point dynamics was designed to seek the Nash equilibrium. Following the distributed framework proposed in [7] , many extended works have been presented to solve the Nash equilibrium seeking problem in two-network zero-sum games. In [8] , the distributed projection gradient method was proposed for the distributed constrained minimax problem, which can be viewed as the constrained two-network zerosum game problem from the perspective of game theory. Then, the authors of [9] focused on the case of the sequential communication and an incremental algorithm was proposed to enable the agents in different networks to update their strategies asynchronously. Note that the graphs of the two networks are fixed and undirected in [8] and [9] , and the authors of [10] developed a distributed subgradient algorithm that works for the switching and unbalanced directed graphs.
The implementation of the aforementioned distributed algorithms requires the gradient or subgradient information of the agents' cost functions. However, such information may be not available when the objective/cost functions are unknown, or it is costly to obtain in practical applications. In this paper, we focus on the two-network zero-sum game problem where the local cost function of each agent is unknown. In fact, the gradient-free schemes have been used to solve the problems of optimizations and games in presence of the unknown cost functions. In particular, the authors of [11] and [12] introduced the stochastic gradient-free methods to solve the optimization problems. Ref. [11] focused on the centralized method and ref. [12] extended it to a distributed method over a directed graph. A stochastic gradient-free algorithm generated by the stochastic differential inclusion was proposed for the noncooperative games in [13] . In [14] , the finite differences were used to approximate the gradients. The evolution strategy, which is developed based on the stochastic gradient approximator, was used in [15] to solve the (centralized) minimax (or called twoplayer zero-sum game) problem. Note that the cost functions involve only one vector in [11] and [12] while each agent's local cost function depends on two vectors corresponding to two networks in two-network zero-sum games. Therefore, the stochastic gradient-free methods presented in [11] and [12] can not be directly used for the two-network zero-sum games. Although the methods developed in [13] and [14] solve games (including zero-sum games), they require the objective functions to be quadratic or smooth. The problem studied in [15] is similar to that considered in this paper, however, it is solved only in a centralized setting. Moreover, even in the networked settings, the methods presented in [13] - [15] are not applicable to the two-network zero-sum games since the agents (in the same network) can not reach agreement about their estimations of the corresponding vector involved in the network cost function. Motivated by the above discussions, this paper aims at developing the distributed subgradient-free algorithm for the two-network zero-sum games.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, a distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm is proposed to achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking of two-network zerosum games. Unlike existing works on the two-network zerosum games [7] - [10] , no exact mathematical formulations but only the measurements of the local cost functions are needed herein. Second, different from the strategies adopted in [13] - [15] , the proposed algorithm solves the problem with the general nonsmooth cost functions in a distributed manner. Third, from a technical perspective, the two-variable oracles are properly designed in this paper for the implementation of the proposed algorithm. This can be viewed as an extension of one-variable oracles given in refs. [11] , [12] .
The structure of this paper is as follows. The preliminaries are provided and the problem is introduced in Section II. The proposed algorithm is presented in Section III. The almost sure convergence of the proposed algorithm is investigated in Section IV. The numerical simulations are presented in Section V and the conclusion is given in Section VI.
Notations: For a differentiable function f , let ∇ x f (·, y) and ∇ y f (x, ·) denote the gradients of f (·, y) at x and f (x, ·) at y, respectively. For a locally Lipschitz and convex but not necessarily differentiable function f , let ∂ x f (·, y) and ∂ y f (x, ·) denote the subgradients (or generalized gradients) of f (·, y) at x and f (x, ·) at y, respectively. The following are from refs. [16] - [18] . For the random variables a distributed on the set U ⊆ R n1 and b distributed on the set W ⊆ R n2 , Ξ[a|b =b] = Uã ψ(ã|b)dã denotes the conditional expectation of a given b =b and Ξ[a] ∆ = Ξ Ξ[a|b] denotes the total expectation of a, where ψ(ã|b) is the conditional probability density of a given b =b, andã andb are real vectors in U and W, respectively. A random event happens "almost surely" means that it happens "with probability one". We will use these two terminologies alternatively, and abbreviate "almost surely" by a.s. in this paper. I i is a vector where the i-th element is 1 and other elements are 0. 0 n denotes an n-dimension vector consisting of 0. |·| and · refer to the absolute value and the Euclidean norm of a scalar and a vector, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Graph theory
Consider a directed graph G = (V, E), with a node set V and an edge set E ⊆ V × V. For any s, i ∈ V, (s, i) ∈ E means that node s sends its information to node i, and s is called the neighbor (i.e., in-neighbor) of i. The adjacency matrix of G is defined by A = [a is ], where a is > 0 for s ∈ N i and a is = 0 for s ∈ V/N i , with N i denoting the set of neighbors (i.e., inneighbors) of i in V (including itself). A is a row-stochastic matrix if s∈V a is = 1 for any i ∈ V. A path from s to i is a sequence of edges (s, s 1 ), . . . , (s n , i). A directed graph is strongly connected if there exists a path from any node s to any node i for s = i.
B. Convex analysis P X : R n → X is the projection operator onto a closed convex set X ⊆ R n if for any vector x ∈ R n , P X (x) satisfies P X (x) ∈ X and x − P X (x) = inf z∈X x − z . A locally Lipschitz function f (·) : R n → R has the generalized gradient ∂ x f . If f is convex, ∂ x f coincides with the subdifferential of f at x, where the subdifferential is the set of all subgradients, i.e.,
is (strictly) convex with respect to x for any fixed y ∈ R n2 and is (strictly) concave with respect to y for any fixed x ∈ R n1 .
C. Saddle point, zero-sum game, and Nash equilibrium
Suppose that X ⊆ R n1 and Y ⊆ R n2 are two closed convex sets and F (x, y) is a strict convex-concave function. Then, F has a unique saddle point [7] , [10] .
Suppose that the set of players in a game is denoted by V = {1, 2, . . . , m} and the cost function of player i ∈ V is 
D. Problem statement
Consider a network with m 1 + m 2 agents and consisting of two subnetworks. The agents in the two subnetworks are labeled as 1, 2, . . . , m 1 and 1, 2, . . . , m 2 , respectively. Each agent in the two subnetworks knows the numbers m 1 and m 2 , respectively. Denote
The global cost function of the first subnetwork, i.e., F (x, y), is the sum of all these local cost functions:
Similarly, let f 2j (x, y) : R n1 × R n2 → R be the (possibly nonsmooth) local cost function of each agent j ∈ V 2 . The global cost function of the second subnetwork, i.e.,F (x, y), is the sum of all these local cost functions:
We consider that the cost functions of these two subnetworks satisfy F (x, y) +F (x, y) = 0 (3) for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y. This implies that F (x, y) = j∈V2 f 2j (x, y). Note that the two subnetworks act as two players and are engaged in a two-player zero-sum game. We call such a game as a two-network zero-sum game [7] , [10] . The strategy (constraint) set of this game is X × Y, where X ⊆ R n1 and Y ⊆ R n2 are the closed and convex sets. In this paper, the exact mathematical expressions of all the local cost functions f 1i and f 2j are not available while each agent i ∈ V 1 and j ∈ V 2 have access to the measurements of f 1i and f 2j , respectively. To be more specific, given any pair (x, y) ∈ R n1 × R n2 , the value of f 1i (x, y) can be obtained by agent i ∈ V 1 and the value of f 2j (x, y) can be obtained by agent j ∈ V 2 . Also, denote Z * = X * ×Y * as the nonempty set composed of the saddle point (
For the setup of graphs, the agents share the information with their neighbors in the same subnetwork, meanwhile, the two subnetworks have access to the information about each other. We describe the communications among the agents in the whole network by a directed bipartite graph G consisting of adjoint node sets V 1 and V 2 , where each node has at least one neighbor (not including itself). The communications within each subnetwork are described by directed graphs G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Each node in V 1 (or V 2 ) has at least one neighbor from V 2 (or V 1 ). An illustrative example for the graph of the whole network is given in Fig. 1 . In what follows, we let A 1 and A 2 be the adjacency matrices associated with G 1 and G 2 , which are row-stochastic.
The objective of this paper is to design a distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm such that the Nash equilibrium seeking is achieved for the considered two-network zero-sum games.
III. DISTRIBUTED STOCHASTIC SUBGRADIENT-FREE ALGORITHM
A. Two-variable Gaussian approximations of cost functions
Before presenting the proposed distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm, we first define the smoothed versions of (1) and (2) .
and W ⊆ R n2 are two sets that are symmetric about 0 n1 and 0 n2 , respectively. In addition, (4) and (5), the differentiability of f ιsµ (x, y), ι = 1, 2, s ∈ V ι , with respect to x and y depends on µ. For µ > 0, it is not hard to see that f ιsµ (x, y) is differentiable with respect to both x and y, i.e., the gradients ∇ x f ιsµ (·, y) and
is convexconcave and locally Lipschitz on a set pair containing X × Y.
The subgradients of f ιs are bounded on the set pair containing X × Y, i.e., there exist positive constants D 1 and D 2 such that
Assumption 3.2: The directed graphs G 1 and G 2 are strongly connected and unbalanced.
B. The proposed algorithm
To achieve the Nash equilibrium seeking of the considered two-network zero-sum games, we propose the distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm. In the proposed algorithm, each agent i ∈ V 1 maintains two variables x k i ∈ R n1 and υ k i ∈ R m1 , and each agent j ∈ V 2 maintains two variables y k j ∈ R n2 and ω k j ∈ R m2 . To be more specific, x k i and y k j are respectively the states of agents i and j, and υ k i and ω k j are the auxiliary variables. At k-th step, where k = 0, 1, . . ., the variables of agents i and j are updated according to
where a 1is and a 2js are the entries of the adjacency matrices A 1 and A 2 . In addition,
are the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles which are defined as:
where µ > 0, ξ k 1i , ξ k 2j ∈ R n1 and η k 1i , η k 2j ∈ R n2 are random variables that are generated from the standard Gaussian distribution over U and W, respectively, Π k 1i , i ∈ V 1 , and Π k 2j , j ∈ V 2 , will be determined later. α k is a step size satisfying
and ω 0 j = I j . Each agent i ∈ V 1 and j ∈ V 2 perform the first and the third equations of (6) to compute the two vectors involved in the cost functions, i.e., x and y, respectively. Π k 1i , i ∈ V 1 , is the estimation of the vector y by agent i at step k and Π k 2j , j ∈ V 2 , is the estimation of the vector x by agent j at step k. According to [8] , [10] , we can set
is a neighbor of i and a 1is = 0 otherwise, in addition, a 2js is similarly defined for s ∈ V 1 . The second and the fourth equations of (6) provide the estimations of the left Perron eigenvectors of A 1 and A 2 by agents i ∈ V 1 and j ∈ V 2 , respectively. In addition, υ k ii and ω k jj are used to scale the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles such that the imbalance issue is properly handled since A 1 and A 2 are only row-stochastic. According to Perron-Frobenius theorem [19] , A ι , ι = 1, 2, has a positive left eigenvector ρ ι = (ρ ι1 , . . . , ρ ιmι ) T corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 and satisfying s∈Vι ρ ιs = 1.
Letx k andȳ k be defined as follows: 
The following lemma presents the fundamental properties of the two-variable Gaussian approximation functions and the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles. The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. Let F k be the σfield generated by the entire history of the random variables in algorithm (6) 
Lemma 3.1: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 hold.
, D 1 and D 2 are given in Assumption 3.1, and n 1 and n 2 are the dimensions of the vectors x and y, respectively; (ii) for any i ∈ V 1 , j ∈ V 2 and k ≥ 0, it
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we first show the almost sure consensus of the agents' states for each subnetworks, i.e., V 1 and V 2 . We then establish the almost sure convergence to the Nash equilibrium of the agents' states of the overall network.
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, we rewrite the first and the third equations in (6) as
where
A. Almost sure consensus
We first present a preliminary result and then establish the almost sure consensus of the agents' states for each subnetworks. The proofs of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1 are given in Appendices B and C, respectively. i } k≥0 and {y k j } k≥0 be generated by (6) . Then, all agents in V 1 achieve consensus almost surely, while all agents in V 2 achieve consensus almost surely. Specifically, for each i ∈ V 1 , lim k→∞ x k i −x k = 0 with probability one, and for each j ∈ V 2 , lim k→∞ y k j −ȳ k = 0 with probability one, wherē x k andȳ k are given in (7) .
B. Almost sure convergence to the Nash equilibrium
The following lemma presents the relation between Ξ[
, which will be used to show the almost sure convergence. The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.2: Suppose that Assumptions 3.1-3.3 hold. Then, for any (x * µ , y * µ ) ∈ Z * µ and k ≥ 0, it holds that
where p k is a nonnegative random variable satisfying ∞ k=0 Ξ[p k ] < ∞ and its expression is given in (17),
To this end, we have established the convergence result that the agents' states converge almost surely to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium, and also specify the bounds of the differences between the limits of the cost values of all the agents and the cost value at the Nash equilibrium. Let (x * , y * ) be the Nash equilibrium, and {x k i } k≥0 and {y k j } k≥0 be generated by (6) . Then, for each i ∈ V 1 ,
Proof: Consider the equation (9) given in Lemma 4.2.
Since
where the monotone convergence theorem has been used in the second equality. Then, using the fact that 
= 0 with probability one. It then follows that lim inf k→∞ F µ (x * µ ,ȳ k ) = F µ (x * µ , y * µ ) and lim inf k→∞ F µ (x k , y * µ ) = F µ (x * µ , y * µ ) with probability one. Note that F µ is continuous. Then, we know that there exist convergent subsequences {x k1 } and {ȳ k1 } such that
with probability one. Furthermore, we know that lim k1→∞x k1 =x µ and lim k1→∞ȳ k1 =ỹ µ for some pair (x µ ,ỹ µ ) ∈ Z * µ with probability one. According to Lemma 3.1 (i), F µ is strictly convex-concave, then it has a unique saddle point on X × Y, i.e., Z * µ = {(x * µ , y * µ )}. Therefore, lim k1→∞x k1 = x * µ and lim k1→∞ȳ k1 = y * µ with probability one. This together with the fact that
is convergent a.s. implies that x k − x * µ 2 + ȳ k − y * µ 2 converges to zero a.s.. This further indicates that lim k→∞ x k − x * µ = 0 (or lim k→∞ x k i − x * µ = 0, i ∈ V 1 ) with probability one and lim k→∞ ȳ k − y * µ = 0 (or lim k→∞ y k j − y * µ = 0, j ∈ V 2 ) with probability one.
Let (x * , y * ) ∈ Z * . Clearly, (x * , y * ) is exactly the Nash equilibrium of the two-network zerosum game. By virtue of the continuity of F µ , one has lim k→∞ F µ (x k , y * ) = F µ (x * µ , y * ) with probability one. Denote ϑ 1 = µ min{m 1 , m 2 }D 2 √ n 2 , 
where one has used Theorem 4.1 in the second inequality. On the other hand, it follows from the continuity of F µ that lim k→∞ F µ (x * ,ȳ k ) = F µ (x * , y * µ ) with probability one. Based on Lemma 3.1 (i), we know 1] . The two subnetworks are equipped with the same strongly connected and unbalanced directed graph shown in Fig. 2 , where each node has a self-loop which is not drawn in Fig. 2 . There is an undirected communication link between any i ∈ V 1 and j ∈ V 2 , where j = i. It can be shown that F (x, y)+F (x, y) = 0 and F (x, y) has a unique saddle point (i.e., the unique Nash equilibrium of the game) (x * , y * ) = (0, 0). We also set α k = 0.1 k+1 , µ = 0.001. Fig. 3 illustrates the total errors between the agents' states in the two subnetworks (or V 1 and V 2 ) and the Nash equilibrium (x * , y * ), i.e., i∈V1 (x k i − x * ) 2 and j∈V2 (y k j − y * ) 2 . It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the total errors approach to 10 −4 (i.e., the size of the Nash equilibrium's neighborhood to which all the agents converge) as the iteration steps increase. This is consistent with our theoretical results. Fig. 3 : The total errors between the agents' states and the Nash equilibrium VI. CONCLUSION This paper has developed a distributed stochastic subgradient-free algorithm for achieving the Nash equilibrium in two-network zero-sum games, where the local cost functions are unknown. The proposed algorithm introduces the subgradient-free two-variable oracles and is applicable to the unbalanced directed graphs. It is shown that by using the proposed algorithm, the agents' states converge almost surely to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the neighborhood can be arbitrary small by taking suitable smooth parameter.
APPENDIX A
For simplicity, we only prove the results for i ∈ V 1 and those for j ∈ V 2 can be similarly obtained.
(i) Based on the definition of f 1iµ and the fact that f 1i is (strictly) convex-concave on the set containing X × Y, it is not hard to show that f 1iµ is (strictly) convex-concave on X × Y. For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y, we denotef i (x, y) y) . Let c and d be two constants which are given in Lemma 3.1 (i). Using the convexity of f 1i (·, y + µη) at x, one hasf i (x, y)
Using the concavity of f 1i (x, ·) at y + µη and the fact that
By using a symmetric analysis, we can obtain f 1iµ (x, y) ≤ f 1i (x, y) + d.
(ii) This part of proof is similar to that of (21) in [11] , which however, concerns the one-variable cost function, i.e., f µ (x). Suppose that the variables x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, ξ ∈ U and η ∈ W are independent with respect to each other. Then, all the mathematical manipulations performed for f µ (x) in the proof of (21) in [11] can be similarly performed for f 1iµ (x, y). By performing such manipulations and using the facts that f 1i (x, y) is independent on (ξ, η) and U e − 1 2 ξ 2 ξdξ = 0, it is not hard to show that ∇ x f 1iµ (x, y) = 1 κ1κ2 U W f1i(x+µξ,y+µη)−f1i(x,y) µ e − 1 2 ξ 2 e − 1 2 η 2 ξdηdξ, where the detailed calculations are omitted due to space limitations. Note that for any fixed k ≥ 0, the variables x k i , Π k 1i , ξ k 1i and η k 1i are independent with respect to each other. Moreover, we know that given i ∈ V 1 , there exists s ∈ V 2 such that a 1is > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume a 1is > 0 for each s ∈ V 2 . Then, based on the facts that y k s ∈ Y for all s ∈ V 2 , Y is a convex set, 0 < a1is s∈V 2 a1is < 1 and 1 s∈V 2 a1is s∈V2 a 1is = 1, we know that Π k 1i ∈ Y. Thus, it follows that the above obtained expression of ∇ x f 1iµ (x, y) holds for x = x k i , y = Π k 1i , ξ = ξ k 1i and η = η k 1i . According to the definition of the conditional expectation Ξ[·|·] given in Section I and Assumption 3.3, it is not hard to show that
Under Assumption 3.3, it can be shown that the expression of ∇ x f 1iµ (x, y) obtained in the proof of (ii) holds for x =x k , y =ỹ k , ξ = ξ k 1i and η = η k 1i , wherex k ∈X k andỹ k ∈Ỹ k . It then follows that for any fixed
be a constant which is given in Lemma 3.1 (iii). It is shown by the definition of the total expectation Ξ[·] and Assumption 3.3 that Ξ[g k i ] ≤ M 2 1 , where Lemma 1 in [11] has been used. Then, it follows from the relation
Moreover, using the similar arguments to those employed to obtain ∇ x f 1iµ (x, y) in the proof of (ii), we can derive ∇ y f 1iµ (x, y) = 1 κ1κ2 U W f1i(x+µξ,y+µη)−f1i(x,y) µ e − 1 2 ξ 2 e − 1 2 η 2 ηdηdξ. It then follows that for any fixed 
, whereg k i is given in the proof of (iii). Therefore, one has
APPENDIX B It is not hard to show that s∈V1 a 1is x k s ∈ X , ∀k ≥ 0. From the proof of Proposition 1 in [20] , we know that υ k ii is positive for any k ≥ 0. Then, following Lemma 1 (b) in [21] , one has ε k
APPENDIX C
We first focus on the analysis for any i ∈ V 1 and k ≥ 2. Denote [A k 1 ] is as the entry of the matrix A k 1 . By using (8) recursively, we obtain
] is ε r−1 1s + ε k−1 1s . Moreover, from (7) and
for all k ≥ 1. By using this fact recursively, one obtainsx k = s∈V1 ρ 1s x 0
for all k ≥ 2. It then follows that
, ∀k ≥ 2. According to Proposition 1 in [20] , we know that there exist β > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 such that for any i, s ∈ V 1 and k ≥ 0, [A k 1 ] is − ρ 1s ≤ βγ k . Using this fact for the first two terms on the right-hand side of the above inequality and the fact 0 < ρ 1s < 1, ∀s ∈ V 1 , for the last two terms, one has that for any k ≥ 2,
. By taking the square and the total expectation on both sides of (10), one obtains
Given an arbitrary ℓ ≥ 2. It is not hard to show that 
where the inequality follows from the facts 0 < γ < 1 and 2ℓ − r + 2 > 0. Therefore, we have
Following the similar analysis to obtain (10), we can derive that for any i ∈ V 1 , 
is almost surely convergent. This implies that for each i ∈ V 1 , the limit of x k i −x k 2 exists with probability one as k → ∞, and lim k→∞ x k i −x k = 0 with probability one, i.e., all the agents in V 1 achieve consensus almost surely.
Applying the similar analysis above for i ∈ V 1 to j ∈ V 2 , one can obtain
Furthermore, we can derive that for each j ∈ V 2 , lim k→∞ y k j −ȳ k = 0 with probability one, i.e., all the agents in V 2 achieve consensus almost surely.
APPENDIX D
For the simplicity of the notation, we will use g 1iµ,k to represent g 1iµ (x k i , Π k 1i ) for the remaining proofs. In the proof of Theorem 4.1, one obtained that for any k ≥ 0,
Then, it follows that for any
Taking the conditional expectation for both sides of this equality on F k yields
ii g 1iµ,k ) ≤ 0 based on Lemma 1 (a) in [21] has been used in the inequality. Then,
where ζ k [20] ) has been used in the second inequality, and β and γ have been given in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Taking the conditional expectation for both sides of this equation on F k and using Lemma 3.1 (iv) yield
For φ k 3 , it follows that φ k
the convexity of f 1iµ (·, Π k 1i ) at x k i , which are based on Lemma 3.1 (i)-(iii), have been used in the inequality.
To present the upper bound of 
Note
where we have used the fact that · 2 is a convex function in the first inequality, Lemma 4.1 in the second inequality, and Lemma 3.1 (iv) and i∈V1 ρ 1i = 1 in the third inequality. Substituting the above inequality and the equations (12)-(14) into the righthand side of (11) yields that for any k ≥ 0, 
where p k 2 is nonnegative and satisfying ∞ k=0 Ξ[p k 2 ] < ∞. Summing up (15) and (16) yields that for any k ≥ 0,
